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                                                 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                      FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                          ___________ 
                                 
                          No. 01-1522 
                          ___________ 
                                 
                         PETER FASANYA, 
                                 
                                                Appellant 
                                 
                               v. 
                                 
                   ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY 
                           ___________ 
 
         On Appeal from the United States District Court 
             for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 
      District Court Judge:  The Honorable Louis C. Bechtle 
                  (Civil Action No. 00-cv-02068) 
                           ___________ 
 
           Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
                         January 17, 2002 
 
      Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges. 
 
                (Opinion Filed: January 29, 2002) 
                     ________________________ 
 
                        MEMORANDUM OPINION 
                     ________________________
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
     Plaintiff Peter Fasanya commenced this action against defendant 
Allstate 
Indemnity Company ("Allstate") under 42 Pa.C.S.  8371 alleging bad faith 
denial of 
insurance coverage.  The defendant responded that it had a reasonable 
basis for its 
coverage decision, namely, that Fasanya's policy had lapsed because he had 
failed to pay 
his premiums.  Both parties filed summary judgment motions, and, on 
December 28, 
2000, the District Court granted Allstate's summary judgment motion and 
denied all other 
pending motions as moot.  Plaintiff appeals. 
     Because we agree with the District Court that no genuine issue of 
material fact 
exists and that Allstate was entitled to judgement as a matter of law, we 
will affirm. 
 
                               I. 
     Since the facts of this case are well known to the parties, we state 
them only in 
summary.  Fasanya purchased an automobile insurance policy from Allstate 
sometime 
before May 2, 1998.  On May 13, Allstate sent a bill to Fasanya requesting 
a minimum 
payment of $161.09.  When no payment was received, Allstate sent Fasanya 
an 
Automobile Cancellation Notice for Non-Payment of Premium dated June 12, 
1998.  The 
notice stated that the minimum amount due was now $327.18 and that 
Allstate would 
cancel the policy if it did not receive that amount by 12:01 a.m. on July 
2, 1998. 
     On July 1, 1998, Fasanya's wife mailed $200.000 along with the 
payment stub 
from the cancellation notice to Allstate.  This was $127.18 less than the 
minimum amount 
due.  Allstate received the payment on July 3, and then, on the same day, 
sent an 
Automobile Insurance Special Notice to Fasanya, which stated: 
     Please be advised that your cancellation effective date is/was 12:01 
a.m. on 
     July 2, 1998.  Your payment of $200.00 was received on July 3, 1998.  
This 
     amount has been applied to your policy; however, as of the date of 
this 
     notice, we still have not received the full minimum amount due.  
Please 
     note that the Cancellation Notice previously sent to you on June 12, 
1998 
     will be enforced unless the full Minimum Amount Due is received on or 
     before July 2, 1998.  In order to avoid having your policy cancel, we 
must 
     receive an additional payment of $132.18 before 12:01 a.m. on July 2, 
     1998.  Otherwise, your policy will terminate according to the 
Cancellation 
     Notice we previously sent you.  The amount due includes a payment fee 
of 
     $5.00.  If you have any questions, please contact your agent. 
      
Plaintiff received the Special Notice on July 7. 
     On July 11, Fasanya was involved in an automobile accident.  On July 
13, he 
mailed the remaining payment of $132.18, which Allstate received on July 
16.  On July 
23, Fasanya notified Allstate of the accident.  Allstate denied coverage 
on Fasanya's 
claim, informing him that his policy had lapsed from July 2, 1998 until 
July 16, 1998.  
Allstate claims that it had sent an Automobile Policy Reinstatement Notice 
to Fasanya on 
July 16, indicating that his policy had experienced the above-described 
lapse in coverage.  
Fasanya, however, claims that Allstate failed to provide him with a notice 
of 
reinstatement.  Fasanya also alleges that, during a telephone call on July 
30, 1999, Esther 
Egbert, an Allstate adjuster, informed Fasanya's counsel that the Fasanya 
policy had not 
lapsed once during its entire term from November 1997 through March 1999.  
Fasanya's 
counsel conceded, however, that Egbert subsequently connected him to 
another Allstate 
employee who reiterated that the policy had lapsed. 
 
                              II. 
     We have appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
 1291.  Our 
review of a district court's grant or denial of a motion for summary 
judgment is plenary.  
See Witkowski v. Welch, 173 F.3d 192, 198 (3d Cir. 1999).  The general 
standard that we 
apply is the same as that employed by the district court under Federal 
Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(c).  See Kelley v. TYK Refractories Co., 860 F.2d 1188, 1192 
(3d Cir. 
1988).  Accordingly, a district court's grant of summary judgement will be 
deemed proper 
only if it appears "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c).  In 
reviewing the record, we are required "to view inferences to be drawn from 
the 
underlying facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion, and to take 
the non-movant's allegations as true whenever these allegations conflict 
with those of the 
movant."  Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
                              III. 
     To state a claim for bad faith denial of insurance coverage under 
Pennsylvania law, 
a plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that his insurer 
(1) lacked a 
reasonable basis for denying coverage, and (2) knew or recklessly 
disregarded its lack of 
a reasonable basis.  See Adamski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 738 A.2d 1033, 1036 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 
1999) appeal denied, Goodman v. Durham, 759 A.2d 387 (Pa. June 29, 2000).  
We 
conclude that Allstate had a reasonable basis for denying Fasanya's claim 
and, thus, agree 
with the District Court's finding that Allstate is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. 
     The undisputed facts show that Allstate sent a cancellation notice on 
June 13, 
1998, that Fasanya failed to pay the minimum amount due by July 2, 1998, 
and that 
Allstate did not receive the remaining portion of the minimum payment 
until July 16, 
1998.  Accordingly, there was a lapse in coverage from July 2, 1998 to 
July 16, 1998.  
Fasanya seeks coverage benefits from Allstate for an accident that took 
place on July 11, 
1998.  Since the policy was not in effect on the date of the accident, we 
conclude that 
Allstate had a reasonable basis for denying coverage. 
     Fasanya argues that his insurance policy should not be deemed to have 
lapsed 
because Allstate took actions which led Fasanya reasonably to expect 
continued coverage.  
 More specifically, he contends that the language of Allstate's Special 
Notice created a 
reasonable expectation of uninterrupted coverage.  We disagree.  The first 
line of the 
Special Notice reads, "Please be advised that your cancellation is/was 
12:01 a.m. on July 
2, 1998."  The notice further states, "In order to avoid having your 
policy cancel, we must 
receive an additional payment of $132.18 before 12:01 a.m. on July 2, 
1998."  While we 
recognize that the Special Notice was sent a day after the cancellation 
date, we find that it 
unambiguously informed Fasanya (in accordance with the Cancellation Notice 
dated June 
12, 1998) that his policy lapsed on July 2, and that, absent full payment 
of the minimum 
amount due, his policy would remain cancelled. 
     We have carefully considered Fasanya's remaining arguments in this 
appeal and 
conclude that they lack merit. 
 
                              IV. 
     For the reasons stated above and in the District Court's thorough and 
well-reasoned 
opinion, we will affirm the Judgement of the District Court. 
 
_____________________________ 
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
 





                                        /s/Julio M. Fuentes                 
                                        Circuit Judge 
